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American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport: Endorsing a 
Presumption of Unconstitutionality Against 
Potentially Religious Symbols 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in American Atheists, Inc. v. Da-
venport1 evinces the “hopeless disarray” of the Supreme Court’s Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence.2 In recent years, the analysis for 
determining the constitutionality of arguably religious symbols on 
public property has been in constant flux as the Supreme Court has 
inconsistently applied various Establishment Clause tests. A court 
applying the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
has available to it the Lemon test,3 the coercion test,4 the reindeer 
rule,5 the endorsement test,6 and “legal judgment.”7 The uncertainty 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence led the Tenth Circuit to split 
5–4 in Davenport on the question of whether to rehear en banc a 
case heard by a Tenth Circuit panel, American Atheists, Inc. v. Dun-
can,8 in which the panel struck down a private organization’s practice 
of honoring slain Utah Highway patrol officers by erecting crosses 
on public property as roadside memorials.9 Two dissenting opinions 
 
 1. 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. 
Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 2. Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(citation omitted). 
 3. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (formulating a three-pronged 
test to determine if there is an Establishment Clause violation). 
 4. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“The Constitution guarantees 
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise”). 
 5. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a crèche display did not 
violate the Establishment Clause because it was surrounded by other secular holiday symbols). 
 6. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
plurality opinion) (adopting the endorsement test as proposed by Justice O’Connor in her 
concurrence in Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688). 
 7. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) 
(“[I]n [borderline] cases, I see no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”). 
 8. 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010), amended and rev’d, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Daven-
port, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Athe-
ists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 9. Id. at 1150. 
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in Davenport highlight the issues with the endorsement test as ap-
plied by the Duncan court and signal that the decision furthers a cir-
cuit split on the issue of how to correctly apply, and even whether to 
apply, the endorsement test.10 
This Note argues that the Tenth Circuit, by reaffirming its deci-
sion in Duncan, approved of an incorrect and incomplete application 
of the endorsement test. However, this Note also argues that the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision is simply evidence of the need for clarifica-
tion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence by the Supreme Court. 
Part II discusses the various Establishment Clause tests formulated 
by the Supreme Court. Part III discusses the facts, procedural histo-
ry, and decisions of the Tenth Circuit in both Duncan and Daven-
port. Part IV argues that the Tenth Circuit incorrectly applied the 
endorsement test by presuming that the memorials were unconstitu-
tional and by failing to consider constitutionally significant elements 
of the memorial at issue, including the names and badge numbers of 
the fallen officers, font size, and the purpose of the memorials. Addi-
tionally, Part IV argues that Supreme Court clarification of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is necessary to resolve a circuit split on 
the issues of whether to apply the endorsement test, and if so, how a 
proper endorsement test analysis should proceed. Part V concludes. 
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part describes the legal background of the Tenth Circuit’s 
decisions in Duncan and Davenport and illustrates the complexity 
and confusion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
 10. See Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1101 (Kelly, J., dissenting); id. at 1110 (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting); see also Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1106–07, 1125 (9th Cir. 
2011) (holding that a war memorial that includes both a cross and purely secular symbols is 
unconstitutional under both the endorsement test and legal judgment test); ACLU of Ky. v. 
Mercer Cnty., 432 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display 
is constitutional under the endorsement test); ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 
F.3d 772, 777–78 n.7 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that a Ten Commandments display 
is constitutional under the legal judgment test); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 
395, 408 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a public school’s daily recitation of the Pledge of Alle-
giance is constitutional under the legal judgment test). 
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A. The Lemon Test 
The Lemon test is a three-part test for analyzing Establishment 
Clause issues.11 Although Lemon is the “touchstone for Establish-
ment Clause analysis,”12 the test has been repeatedly maligned13 and 
has generated much confusion.14 Nonetheless, the three-part Lemon 
test provides the starting point for analyzing Establishment Clause 
issues. The first part of Lemon requires that the government’s action 
“have a secular legislative purpose.”15 Second, the “principal or pri-
mary effect [of the government’s action] must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion.”16 Finally, the governmental action 
“must not foster an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.”17 Lemon analysis requires that all three prongs of the test be 
met for the government to avoid an Establishment Clause viola-
tion.18 
B. The Reindeer Rule 
As a gloss over the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has found 
that public displays, even those that are clearly religious and have a 
sectarian message, may be constitutional if they are a part of a setting 
that “changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose 
of the display . . . [and] negates any message of [governmental] en-
dorsement of that content.”19 This rule, termed here the “reindeer 
 
 11. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1156. 
 12. Id. (citations omitted). 
 13. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part) (“Persuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged”); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 640 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Abandoning Lemon’s 
purpose test . . . [which] has no basis in the language or history of the [First] Amendment . . . 
would be a good place to start [clarifying Establishment Clause jurisprudence].”); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The three-part [Lemon] test has 
simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases.”). 
 14. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685–86 (2005) (discussing the confusion 
caused by the Lemon test). 
 15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 18. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2010), amended 
and rev’d, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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rule,”20 allows the government to avoid an establishment of religion 
by including “purely secular symbols” in a religious display.21 
C. The Endorsement Test 
The case law underpinning the Establishment Clause became 
even more uncertain when the Supreme Court began applying the 
Lemon test through the lens of an endorsement test. The endorse-
ment test asks whether “the challenged governmental action is suffi-
ciently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling deno-
minations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a 
disapproval, of their individual religious choices.”22 In essence, the 
endorsement test modifies the Lemon test by asking “whether the 
challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 
‘endorsing’ religion.”23 The key concern underlying the endorse-
ment test is that government be precluded from making citizens feel 
like civic outsiders; that is, “from conveying or attempting to convey 
a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or 
preferred.”24 
The endorsement test, although commendable in purpose, has 
been frequently maligned because it allows for subjective analysis by 
judges and thus leads to unpredictability.25 The subjectivity stems 
 
 20. The term “reindeer rule” stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v. Don-
nelly where the Court held that a crèche display that was surrounded by secular decorations 
such as a Santa Claus house, reindeer, and a sleigh was constitutional. Id. at 671, 687 (majority 
opinion). Courts and commentators ridiculed Lynch by suggesting it created a rule whereby 
“the state [could] temper the religious elements of a display with secular symbols” such as plas-
tic reindeer. David Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm? Nontaxpayer Standing to Challenge Reli-
gious Symbols, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1095 (2011); see also ACLU v. City of Bir-
mingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1569 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A] city can get by [an Establishment 
Clause challenge] with displaying a creche if it throws in a sleigh full of toys and a Santa Claus, 
too.”). 
 21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 22. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (Blackmun, J., plurality 
opinion) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)). 
 23. Id. at 592. 
 24. Id. at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (emphasis omitted)). 
 25. See Patrick M. Garry, A Congressional Attempt to Alleviate the Uncertainty of the 
Court’s Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Public Expression of Religion Act, 37 CUMB. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2006–07) (“[T]he test calls for judges to speculate about the perceptions that un-
known people may have about various religious speech or symbols, its application is inherently 
uncertain.”); see also McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 901 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[E]ven if a government could show that its actual purpose was not to advance 
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from the test’s use of a “reasonable observer” to determine whether 
the display at issue has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion.26 
What this “reasonable observer” thinks of the constitutionality of a 
given display is left up to a judge’s subjective determination of what 
is reasonable. Various Justices have noted that the reasonable observ-
er takes into account, among other things, “the values underlying 
the Free Exercise Clause,”27 “cultural diversity,”28 “all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding a challenged display,”29 and “the history 
and context of the community and forum in which the religious dis-
play appears.”30 
D. The Coercion Test 
A majority of the Supreme Court has never relied solely on the 
coercion test to decide a case involving potentially religious displays. 
However, several members of the Court have indicated that they 
would prefer to apply the coercion test in religious display cases.31 
The coercion test holds “that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a 
way which ‘establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.’”32 
E. The Exercise of Legal Judgment 
Two recent Establishment Clause cases decided by the Supreme 
Court seem to turn on Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment.” In 
McCreary County v. ACLU, the Court held, 5–4, that a display of 
 
religion, it would presumably violate the Constitution as long as the Court’s objective observer 
would think otherwise.”). 
 26. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). 
 27. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
 28. Id. at 636. 
 29. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 30. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 31. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits only “actual legal coercion”); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the crèche 
display did not violate the Establishment Clause because “[t]here is no suggestion here that 
the government’s power to coerce has been used to further the interests of Christianity or Ju-
daism in any way”). 
 32. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 678 (1984)) (additions in quotation omitted). 
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the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.33 The Court emphasized that the history of the dis-
play would lead a reasonable observer to think “that the [govern-
ment] meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments’ 
religious message.”34 Justice Breyer voted with the majority in 
McCreary County, but did not write either for the majority or sepa-
rately. 
On the very same day that the Court handed down McCreary 
County, it also decided Van Orden v. Perry.35 In Van Orden, the 
Court held, 5–4, that a Ten Commandments display located near the 
Texas State Capitol building did not violate the Establishment 
Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, focused on 
the Ten Commandments’ “undeniable historical meaning.”36 Justice 
Breyer concurred with the plurality as to the judgment, but wrote 
separately to explain his views on why this display was constitutional. 
Justice Breyer explained that for “borderline cases” he saw “no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”37 Justice Breyer 
offered the following explanation of what is meant by legal judg-
ment: 
[Legal] judgment is not a personal judgment. Rather, as in all con-
stitutional cases, it must reflect and remain faithful to the underly-
ing purposes of the [Religion] Clauses, and it must take account of 
context and consequences measured in light of those purposes. 
While the Court’s prior tests provide useful guideposts—and might 
well lead to the same result the Court reaches today—no exact 
formula can dictate a resolution to such fact-intensive cases.38 
Justice Breyer’s legal judgment in Van Orden led him to focus 
on several factors, including: (1) that the display was donated, (2) 
that the display had a long history, 40 years, of being unchallenged, 
and (3) the context of the display, namely that it was near other mo-
numents. In the end, Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment” led him to 
find the Van Orden display constitutional and the McCreary County 
display unconstitutional. 
 
 33. 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005). 
 34. Id. at 869. 
 35. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 36. Id. at 690. 
 37. Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 38. Id. (citations omitted). 
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III. THE COURT’S DECISION 
A. Facts of the Case 
The Utah Highway Patrol Association (Association) is a private 
organization that supports the Utah Highway Patrol (UHP).39 In 
1998, the Association began a project intended to honor UHP troo-
pers killed in the line of duty.40 The project consisted of placing 
twelve-foot crosses near the locations where individual UHP troo-
pers died.41 The Association used white crosses because “only a white 
cross could effectively convey the simultaneous messages of death, 
honor, remembrance, gratitude, sacrifice, and safety.”42 The crosses 
also display a painting of the name, rank, and badge number of the 
trooper being honored, the UHP’s beehive symbol, a picture of the 
deceased trooper, and a plaque showing biographical information of 
the trooper.43 
The Association took care to ensure that the memorials would 
convey the intended message to passersby, whom the Association 
recognized would be passing the memorials at, or above, fifty-five 
miles per hour.44 The Association painted the officer’s name and 
badge number in large, black lettering.45 Additionally, the Associa-
tion placed each memorial where it was “(1) visible to the public; (2) 
safe to stop and view; and (3) as close to the actual spot of the troo-
per’s death as possible.”46 The State of Utah does not officially “ap-
prove[] or disapprove [of] the memorial markers” but has allowed  
 
 
 39. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2010) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 
(2011). 
 40. Id.; see also Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that the UHPA asserted four purposes for erecting the memorials, including “(1) [to] 
stand as a lasting reminder . . . that a . . . trooper gave his life in service to [the State of Utah]; 
(2) [to] remind highway drivers that a trooper died . . . to make the state safe for all citizens; 
(3) [to] honor the trooper and the sacrifice he and his family made for the State of Utah; and 
(4) [to] encourage safe conduct on the highways”), amended and rev’d, Davenport, 637 F.3d 
1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 12. 
 41. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151. 
 45. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 46. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1151 (citation omitted). 
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the Association to erect thirteen markers on public property 
throughout Utah.47 
B. Procedural History 
American Atheists, Inc. (American Atheists) and three of its 
members living in Utah challenged the legality of the Association’s 
memorials as violating the Establishment Clause of the United States 
Constitution.48 As relief, American Atheists sought both an injunc-
tion ordering that the UHP beehive logo be removed from all Asso-
ciation memorials and also a declaration stating that Utah violated 
American Atheists members’ constitutional rights by allowing the 
UHP logo to be placed on the memorials.49 The district court held 
that the memorials did not violate the Establishment Clause.50 Amer-
ican Atheists appealed to the Tenth Circuit.51 
C. American Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan 
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, American Atheists argued that 
the memorials violated the Establishment Clause—specifically that 
the memorials violated the first and second prongs of Lemon.52 The 
Tenth Circuit noted that although Lemon has been questioned, it 
remains the “touchstone for Establishment Clause analysis” and 
should provide the analytical framework.53 Additionally, the court 
stated that it must interpret the first and second prongs of Lemon “in 
light of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test.”54 The court stated 
that “Justice O’Connor’s modification of the Lemon test makes our 
inquiry very case-specific, as it asks this court to examine carefully the  
 
 
 
 47. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1102 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting Duncan, 616 F.3d at 
1151). 
 48. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1150. 
 49. Id. at 1152. 
 50. Id. (additionally, the district court rejected state constitutional claims brought by 
American Atheists). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1156. American Atheists did not argue that the memorials violated the third 
prong of Lemon. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1156–57 (quoting Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 
1030 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
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particular context and history of these displays before concluding 
what effect they would likely have on the reasonable observer.”55 
1. Applying prong one of Lemon 
In applying prong one of Lemon, the court stated that “[i]n de-
ciding whether the government’s purpose was improper, a court 
must view the conduct through the eyes of an ‘objective observer,’ 
one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up 
in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or 
comparable official act.”56 Using this standard, the court held that 
“[it could] discern a plausible secular purpose.”57 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court found two considerations relevant. First, the 
Association consistently maintained that its purpose in erecting the 
memorials was entirely secular, specifically, to honor fallen highway 
patrol troopers and to promote safety on Utah’s highways.58 Second, 
the Association’s secular purpose was enhanced “by the fact that the 
memorials were designed by two individuals who are members of the 
Mormon faith[,] . . . a religion that does not use the cross as a reli-
gious symbol.”59 In light of these considerations, the court was will-
ing to attribute the independent Association’s motivation to the 
State and hold that the memorials did not violate prong one of Lem-
on.60 
2. Applying prong two of Lemon 
Next, the court applied prong two of Lemon, which asks whether 
the governmental action has “the effect of communicating govern-
mental endorsement or disapproval” of religion.61 The court stated 
that it would answer this question “through the eyes of an objective 
observer who is aware of the purpose, context, and history of the 
symbol” and “presume[d] that the court-created ‘objective observer’ 
is aware of information ‘not limited to the information gleaned simp-
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1030). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1157. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1158 (quoting Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F. 3d 784, 799 
(10th Cir. 2009)). 
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ly from viewing the challenged display.’”62 To determine whether 
the memorials at issue had the effect of endorsing religion, the court 
focused on two aspects: (1) the government’s purpose and (2) the 
context and history of the memorials.63 
Although the court found that the memorials did not violate the 
purpose prong of Lemon, it stated that “[s]eparate from Lemon’s first 
test, courts also consider the Government’s purpose in undertaking 
the challenged conduct as illustrative of the effect that conduct con-
veys.”64 The court then briefly restated that the government’s pur-
pose was “to incorporate the UHP symbol into the memorials and 
to place the crosses on public land.”65 Even though the government 
had a valid secular purpose, the court noted that “the State’s secular 
purpose is merely one element . . . we consider . . . to determine 
whether these memorial crosses would have an impermissible effect 
on the reasonable observer.”66 
The court next considered the context and history of the memo-
rials. At the outset, the court stated that the Latin cross “is unequi-
vocally a symbol of the Christian faith.”67 Because of this, “these dis-
plays . . . can only be allowed if their context or history avoid the 
conveyance of a message of governmental endorsement of reli-
gion.”68 The court concluded that the context and history of the 
memorials could not save them from unconstitutionality and held 
that the memorials had the impermissible effect of conveying to a 
reasonable observer that the State was endorsing Christianity.69 The 
court reasoned that the fact that the cross also displayed the deceased 
trooper’s biographical information did not overcome the govern-
ment’s message of endorsement.70 This was especially true, the court 
reasoned, where most viewers of the monument would see it while 
going fifty-five or more miles per hour.71 Additionally, the court rea-
 
 62. Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, N.M., 541 F.3d 1017, 1031 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting O’Connor v. Washburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
 63. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1159. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1022). 
 68. Id. at 1160. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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soned that “the fact that . . . the fallen UHP troopers are memoria-
lized with a Christian symbol conveys the message that there is some 
connection between the UHP and Christianity.”72 Because of this, a 
reasonable observer may fear that the UHP would give preferential 
treatment to Christians.73 Finally, because of the message they would 
convey to a non-Christian walking into the UHP office, the court 
noted that it was “deeply concerned about” the two memorial 
crosses located outside the UHP office.74 
The court’s analysis also rejected four contextual arguments 
raised by the State, including: (1) that the displays were clearly in-
tended as memorials; (2) that the displays “are located in areas where 
similar memorials have been displayed;” (3) that the designers of the 
displays “do not revere the cross;” and (4) that the majority of the 
State’s citizens “do not revere the cross.”75 Even admitting “that 
some of these contextual elements may help reduce the message of 
religious endorsement,” the court nevertheless held “that these dis-
plays nonetheless have the impermissible effect of [endorsement].”76 
As to the State’s argument that the displays were intended as 
memorials, the court stated that although “a reasonable observer 
would recognize these memorial crosses as symbols of death[,] . . . 
there is no evidence . . . that the cross has been universally embraced 
as a marker for the burial sites of non-Christians.”77 Additionally, the 
court ultimately rejected the argument that it should “treat memorial 
crosses in . . . the same way as the Supreme Court has treated 
Christmas trees and . . . the Ten Commandments.”78 Consequently, 
“[u]nlike Christmas, which has been widely embraced as a secular 
holiday . . . there is no evidence in this case that the cross has been 
widely embraced by non-Christians as a secular symbol of death.”79 
Additionally, the court concluded that the memorials were unlike a 
Ten Commandments display that is a part of a historical presentation 
because the memorials here “stand alone, adorned with the state  
 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1160 n.13. 
 75. Id. at 1161–64. 
 76. Id. at 1161. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1162. 
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highway patrol insignia and some information about the trooper 
who died there.”80 
The court rejected the State’s second argument—that the cross is 
a fairly common symbol used in roadside memorials—because the 
State failed to provide “evidence that non-Christians have embraced 
the use of crosses as roadside memorials.”81 Moreover, the court 
claimed that even if the roadside cross was a secular symbol of death, 
“the memorial crosses . . . in this case appear to be much larger than 
the crosses typically found on the side of public roads.”82 
The court rejected the State’s third argument—that the designers 
of the memorial did not revere the cross—because the memorials 
may have impermissibly affected a reasonable observer, regardless of 
the creator’s intent.83 The court stated that “the intended and per-
ceived significance of [the State’s] conduct may not coincide with 
the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.”84 
Finally, the court rejected the State’s fourth argument—that only 
a minority of Utah citizens reveres the cross as a religious symbol.85 
The court noted that “it is [not] implausible, as a general matter, for 
a [government] . . . to endorse a minority faith.”86 Based on this 
principle, the court held that “the fact that most Utahns do not re-
vere the cross as a symbol of their faith does not mean that the State 
cannot violate the Establishment Clause by conduct that has the ef-
fect of promoting the cross.”87 
D. Denial of Rehearing Duncan En Banc 
Just over four months after deciding Duncan, a five-judge major-
ity refused to rehear the case en banc.88 The majority did not elabo-
rate on the Duncan opinion, except only to amend one word.89 Four 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1163. 
 84. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 476 (2009)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 n.64 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., concurring)). 
 87. Id. at 1163–64. 
 88. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1101 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. de-
nied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 89. Id. 
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judges dissented from the decision not to rehear the case en banc, 
and two judges wrote dissenting opinions expressing their views.90 
1. Judge Kelly’s dissent 
Judge Kelly dissented and focused his argument on what he saw 
as the court’s “increasing[] hostil[ity] to religious symbols in the 
public sphere”91 in contravention of the Supreme Court’s recent 
statement that “the Establishment Clause does not require us to 
‘purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes in the reli-
gious.’”92 Judge Kelly argued that the Duncan court’s reasonable 
observer analysis was problematic in three important ways. First, the 
court’s analysis employed a presumption against constitutionality in 
contravention of precedent.93 Under this newly created presumption, 
the cross is viewed as a religious symbol, unless contextual elements 
are sufficient to overcome that presumption.94 Second, the court’s 
reasonable observer failed to properly consider the appearance, con-
text, and history of the memorials.95 Finally, Judge Kelly found it 
problematic that “the court equates the religious nature of the cross 
with a message of endorsement.”96 
2. Judge Gorsuch’s dissent 
Judge Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion in which he agreed 
with much of Judge Kelly’s reasoning, but also wrote to add two ad-
ditional disagreements with the Duncan court.97 
First, Judge Gorsuch disagreed with Duncan’s application of the 
reasonable observer test.98 Judge Gorsuch argued that the Duncan 
observer “starts with the biased presumption that Utah’s roadside 
crosses are unconstitutional” and that the observer “disregards 
the . . . secularizing details—such as the fallen trooper’s name in-
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring 
in judgment) (emphasis omitted). 
 93. Id. at 1102–03. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1101–02. 
 96. Id. at 1102. 
 97. Id. at 1107 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 1107–08. 
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scribed on the crossbar—that might allow him to change his 
mind.”99 Additionally, Judge Gorsuch noted that “[i]t seems we 
must also take account of our observer’s selective and feeble eye-
sight”100 because the Duncan observer seems unable to see the de-
ceased trooper’s name on the cross even though the same text size is 
used to paint the name as is used “for posting the words ‘SPEED 
LIMIT’ alongside major . . . highways.”101 Judge Gorsuch summed 
up his argument by stating that “[the Tenth Circuit] will strike down 
laws other courts would uphold, and do so whenever a reasonably 
biased, impaired, and distracted viewer might confuse them for an 
endorsement of religion.”102 
Judge Gorsuch’s second point was that the reasonable observer 
test may itself be “constitutionally problematic.”103 Judge Gorsuch 
noted that in this case it was “undisputed that the state actors here 
did not act with any religious purpose,” and thus “the court strikes 
down Utah’s policy only because it is able to imagine a hypothetical 
‘reasonable observer’ who could think Utah means to endorse reli-
gion—even when it doesn’t.”104 Judge Gorsuch took the Duncan 
court to task for choosing not to apply the approach taken by other 
courts, including a plurality in Van Orden, who declined to apply the 
endorsement test and questioned its application in Establishment 
Clause cases.105 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This Note critiques the Tenth Circuit’s application of the en-
dorsement test and suggests that the court failed to consider impor-
tant contextual elements that could lead a reasonable observer to 
conclude that the memorials did not have the impermissible effect of 
endorsing religion. Additionally, this Note argues that the Supreme 
Court should clarify Establishment Clause jurisprudence with regard 
to potentially religious displays. 
 
 99. Id. at 1108. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1109. 
 102. Id. at 1110 (emphasis omitted). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 105. See id. 
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A. The Tenth Circuit’s Misapplication of the Endorsement Test 
As an initial matter, the Tenth Circuit misapplied the endorse-
ment test by reversing traditional endorsement test analysis. The tra-
ditional endorsement test first analyzes the context, history, and ap-
pearance of a memorial before finding it unconstitutional.106 For 
example, in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court was 
presented with the question of whether a crèche display and a meno-
rah display located outside a city building were unconstitutional.107 
The Court rejected the dissent’s approach, which would have em-
ployed a presumption of unconstitutionality because the symbols 
were inherently religious and displayed on public property.108 Rather, 
the Court employed the traditional endorsement test analysis by ana-
lyzing the appearance, history, and contextual elements of the dis-
plays.109 The Tenth Circuit set the bar too high for the State by 
holding that because the cross is the “preeminent symbol of Chris-
tianity” it would only be permissible “if the[] context or history 
avoid[ed] the conveyance of a message of governmental endorse-
ment of religion.”110 Rather than employ traditional endorsement 
analysis as the Court in County of Allegheny did, the Tenth Circuit 
reversed the analysis by presuming that the cross is a religious symbol 
and is therefore unconstitutional. Only after this presumption was in 
place did the court look to see if the context or history suggested 
otherwise. 
Apart from the issue of the Duncan majority presuming the me-
morials were unconstitutional, the majority’s version of the reasona-
ble observer undervalues the effect a valid secular purpose has on the 
reasonable observer. A State’s secular purpose is one contextual ele-
ment that the Tenth Circuit factors into determining whether a reli-
gious symbol would have an impermissible effect upon a reasonable 
observer.111 The Duncan majority frequently reasoned that the 
crosses were large and easily seen by passersby.112 The large size of 
 
 106. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598–600 (1989). 
 107. Id. at 578. 
 108. Id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 616–20 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). 
 110. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010), amended and 
rev’d, Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Utah 
Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 (2011). 
 111. Id. at 1159. 
 112. See, e.g., id. at 1162. 
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the crosses led the court to hold that the memorials had the imper-
missible effect of endorsing religion.113 Yet, the court also found that 
the State’s purpose in allowing the Association to erect the crosses 
was not impermissible.114 One is left to wonder how the Association, 
and by implication the State, could effectively accomplish the per-
missible purpose of memorializing slain troopers and informing the 
public of the trooper’s service without using a memorial that is big 
enough for the public to view as they pass by at fifty-five or more 
miles per hour. The court’s analysis effectively puts the State in a 
catch-22 where it could either build crosses so small that they could 
not fulfill the State’s valid secular purpose, or build the crosses as 
they were here but suffer the fate of unconstitutionality. One re-
sponse to this argument is that the State could simply use something 
other than a cross to convey its valid secular purpose, and in the fu-
ture it would seem prudent for the State to do so. However, it none-
theless seems illogical that the court could find that the State had a 
valid secular purpose for putting up the crosses, yet still hold that it 
acted unconstitutionally by putting up a memorial big enough to ef-
fectively carry out its purpose. A state’s clearly secular purpose 
should be given more weight in analyzing the effect a memorial has 
on the reasonable observer. 
The Tenth Circuit also erred in its reasonable observer analysis 
by failing to give sufficient weight to the contextual elements sur-
rounding the crosses. For example, the court acknowledged that the 
contextual elements surrounding the crosses “may help reduce the 
message of religious endorsement,” yet held that the crosses violated 
the second prong of Lemon.115 This holding fails to “acknowledge 
the entirety” of the contextual elements surrounding the crosses.116 
For example, the Duncan court’s reasonable observer fails to ac-
knowledge that the officer’s name, rank, and badge number are em-
blazoned in large writing on the cross in the same font size as the 
words “SPEED LIMIT” on interstate highway signs. A reasonable 
observer would certainly take this into account and would be more 
likely to find that the memorial is meant to honor the person whose 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 1159. 
 115. Id. at 1161. 
 116. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2010) (Kelly, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12 
(2011). 
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name is written on the cross than that it is meant to endorse religion. 
Further, the court noted that it has particular concern over the 
crosses in front of the UHP office.117 This concern cuts against the 
court’s argument that the memorials are especially troubling when 
the general public passes a majority of the monuments while travel-
ing at fifty-five or more miles per hour. It could be true that the rea-
sonable observer would “miss” seeing the contextual elements sur-
rounding the cross when traveling at high speeds. But in the case of 
the memorials in front of the UHP office, this concern is not 
present. Rather, the reasonable observer would have plenty of time 
to observe and examine the memorials to determine their context 
and thus should be less likely, not more likely, to find that these 
memorials have the impermissible effect of endorsement. At any rate, 
even though the memorials at issue in this case should have satisfied 
the Tenth Circuit panel’s reasonable observer because of the secula-
rizing contextual factors, as Judge Gorsuch notes in his dissent, 
courts should not have to take account of a reasonable observer who 
is “biased, impaired, [or] distracted.”118 
B. The Need for Supreme Court Clarification of Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence 
While the Tenth Circuit arguably erred in its application of the 
endorsement test,119 what Duncan and Davenport actually highlight 
most are not the errors of the Tenth Circuit, but rather the lack of 
guidance from the Supreme Court in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.120 A consequence of the Supreme Court’s “nebulous Estab-
lishment Clause”121 jurisprudence is that lower courts rely more 
heavily on their own precedents, rather than face the daunting task 
of distilling into a workable rule the confusing and seemingly arbi-
trary Supreme Court Establishment Clause precedents. Indeed, this 
is exactly what the Tenth Circuit did in Duncan. Before applying the 
endorsement test, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court 
 
 117. Duncan, 616 F.3d at 1161 n.13. 
 118. Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1110 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 119. See supra notes 106–18 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 22 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[O]ur Establishment Clause precedents 
remain impenetrable . . . [and] [i]t is difficult to imagine an area of the law more in need of 
clarity.”). 
 121. Id. at 13. 
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remains “sharply divided on the standard governing Establishment 
Clause cases.”122 Because of this sharp divide, the Tenth Circuit 
turned to its own precedent to determine the controlling test for Es-
tablishment Clause challenges.123 Yet, even though it relied heavily 
on its own precedent, uncertainty about how to apply the endorse-
ment test still crept into the court’s decision. For example, when dis-
cussing what the endorsement test’s reasonable observer can be as-
sumed to know the court noted that “[h]ow much information we 
will impute to a reasonable observer is unclear.”124 Uncertainty such 
as this is not the fault of lower courts. Justice Thomas recently stated 
as much when he said, “One might be forgiven for failing to discern 
a workable principle that explains these wildly divergent out-
comes. . . . Whether a given court’s hypothetical observer will be any 
beholder (no matter how unknowledgeable), or the average behold-
er, or . . . the ultra-reasonable beholder, is entirely unpredictable.”125 
In the end, courts will continue to disagree widely over core Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudential issues, including whether the en-
dorsement test or some other test controls in Establishment Clause 
religious symbol cases. And assuming the endorsement test does 
control, what does the reasonable observer see, feel, and know with 
respect to that religious display? The current circuit split suggests 
that these core disagreements are already taking place, and it is likely 
that the split will only widen in coming years unless the Supreme 
Court intervenes and clarifies Establishment Clause jurisprudence.126 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Tenth Circuit’s opinions in Duncan and Davenport com-
pound and perpetuate the confusion caused by the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, specifically the endorsement 
test. Even assuming that the endorsement test is still the preferred 
Establishment Clause test, the Duncan court failed to properly apply 
 
 122. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (2010), amended and rev’d, 
Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. 12. 
 123. For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s application of its own precedent see Steven 
M. Lau, Note, Ignoring Purpose, Context, and History: The Tenth Circuit Court in American 
Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 2011 BYU L. REV. 149. 
 124. Id. at 1159 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 19–20 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 126. See supra note 10. 
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the test because it did not properly consider all of the context, histo-
ry, and purposes of the memorials. Unfortunately, this precedent will 
stand because the Supreme Court has rejected the opportunity to use 
Duncan to clear up the muddled Establishment Clause jurispruden-
tial waters.127 
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 127. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n., 132 S. Ct. at 12 (denying certiorari); id. at 13 (Tho-
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